Idealization and Abstraction in Normative and Empirical Disciplines

Idealization and Abstraction in Normative and Empirical Disciplines

VEGA 1/0557/23

Principal Investigator: doc. Mgr. Lukáš Bielik, PhD.
Vice-Principal Investigator: Mgr. Juraj Halas, PhD.
Researchers: Prof. PhDr. František Gahér, CSc., prof. Mgr. Marián Zouhar, PhD., doc. Mgr. Vladimír Marko, PhD., Mgr. Dalibor Makovník

Project Description

The project analyzes the different nature of idealizations and abstractions in normative and empirical disciplines. Its aim is to determine to what extent idealized concepts and assumptions in theories of normative disciplines (logic, jurisprudence, etc.) differ from idealized concepts and assumptions in descriptive theories of empirical science. The chief hypothesis of the project is that the differences between the types of theories (normative/descriptive) in which idealizations occur are manifested (a) in their different methodological function and (b) in the different ways in which these types of theories are criticized. It can be assumed that while in empirical disciplines idealized assumptions perform functions related to the simplification of the target system, in normative disciplines they rather perform the function of motivational or evaluative criteria (for behavior/action).

Project Goals

Idealizing assumptions as consciously accepted false representations of a certain (target) system and abstractions as deliberately simplified representations of a system with a positive theoretical function are an important part of certain theories and models in empirical science, semantics, logic or philosophy. Previous research in the philosophy of science on the nature and functions of idealizing assumptions and abstractions has been largely confined to empirical disciplines. The aim of this project is to investigate how, if at all, idealizing assumptions used in normative theories (theories that prescribe what is to be done, e.g., logic, some semantic theories, law, etc.) differ from those that are part of empirical sciences (e.g., economics, physics, biology, sociology, or political science). The particular stages of the project are intended to provide an answer to the following research questions: What constructive role does falsity and/or abstraction play in the construction of logical and semantic theories? What idealizing assumptions are implicit in the application of logical or semantic theories to the analysis of argumentative discourse? How to distinguish methodologically adequate idealizing assumptions from inadequate assumptions? How can one (non-trivially) criticize normative theories containing idealizations, and how can one test and evaluate empirical theories with idealizing assumptions? What function do idealizations and abstractions serve in normative theories and what function do they serve in empirical theories? How is the use of conditionals (both indicative and counterfactual) related to idealization and de-idealization? How can statements invoking the ceteris paribus clause be tested? What systematic differences can be identified between idealizing propositions (i.e., propositions expressed by a complete sentence) and concepts of idealized entities? The main hypothesis of the project is the claim that the differences between the types of theories (normative/descriptive) in which idealizations occur are manifested (a) in their different methodological function and (b) in the different ways in which these types of theories can be criticized.