The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan  
as the Voice of the Powerless—  
Building Taiwanese National Identity  

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Abstract  The aim of this paper is to show how and why the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (PCT) contributed to forming a new Taiwanese national identity in its public statements Zhongyao wenxian 重要文献 (Important Documents; 1971–95). The PCT saw its mission in establishing bonds, and thus connected national Taiwanese identity closely with a specific identity of the PCT.

Keywords  China, Taiwan, Christianity, Mission, Presbyterian Church · National Identity, Taiwanese National Identity

Introduction

The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (PCT) is the largest and also the oldest continuously existing protestant denomination in Taiwan. It is not just religious organization, but also a movement for social change and political rights. Since

1  Amae Yoshihisa 天江喜久, »Europeans and the Formation of a Presbyterian Enterprise: A
the very first Presbyterian missionaries came to Taiwan in 1858, the church has
been very active in many different social events such as education, health care,
charity, etc. The church has built up a highly focused social welfare designed to
help different communities. Furthermore, in 1970s, the church started to be
politically active—it began to fight for democratization, human rights, rights of
minorities and underprivileged people, it promoted usage of Taiwanese dialect
and local languages. But most importantly for the paper, the PCT had been
involved in creating a new Taiwanese national identity. The paper is interested
in the way how Taiwan has been narrated as a national subject within the public
statements of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan since 1971.

During the Japanese colonial era, Taiwanese population was a subject to
strong assimilation. Then, with an arrival of the Kuomintang government
(Guomindang 国民黨, KMT) from mainland China, a strong sinization began.
At this time a new nationalist movements arose. However, according to Shih
Fang-Long, Taiwanese national movements should be seen as discontinuous
formation which began in 1920s, really taking shape in the 1970s, and revived in
the 1980s as an integral part of democratic discourse. The nationalist move-
ments differed in in who they perceived to be part of a Taiwanese nation. Some
nationalist movements were based on ethnic nationalism, while others on
common citizenship. The latter mentioned was also the case of the PCT, which
in public statements created a Taiwanese nation based on such civic nationalism.
Instead of highlighting the common ethnic roots, PCT’s civic nationalism
stressed a common identity and common aims. The PCT tried to show the
uniqueness of Taiwanese people, their difference from Chinese in mainland
China, and an importance of local, ethnical diversity of people in Taiwan. For a

Prototype of a Civic Taiwanese Nation?, in European Perspectives on Taiwan, ed. by Jens Damm

Murray Rubinstein, »Christianity and Democratization in Modern Taiwan: The Presbyterian
Church and the Struggle for Minnan / Hakka Selfhood in the Republic of China«, in Religion in
Modern Taiwan: Tradition and Innovation in a Changing Society, ed. by Philip Clart and Brewer

Shih Fang-Long, »Taiwan’s Subjectivity and National Narrations: Towards a Comparative
Perspective with Ireland«, Taiwan in Comparative Perspective 4 (2012) 6–33, here 17.
long time, Taiwanese national identity was suppressed. The church’s mission was established between various ethnic groups, and that is the reason why the PCT didn’t want to favor only one ethnic group.

The Presbyterians were forced by historical circumstances to take a role of a defendant of Taiwanese people. Many of Presbyterian members, which were prominent leaders in local communities, were also victims of the ‘2·28 Incident’ (ererka shijian 二二八事件) in 1947.4 During the period of so-called White Terror (haisekongbu 白色恐怖), many Taiwanese intellectuals were constantly interrogated or even eliminated—a large number of them were the PCT’s members. Everyone feared persecution. Initially, there were protests against the KMT exclusively abroad. Similarly, representatives of the PCT who went abroad informed the world about the unfortunate situation in Taiwan. But after some time, the PCT, unlike other Christian groups, started not be afraid to openly formulate their concerns about the rule of the KMT government. The PCT had a greater representation of local Taiwanese pastors who could easily identify themselves with oppression and problems experienced by whole Taiwanese society. The PCT decided to represent the voice of the oppressed population. They were using the local languages during religious services and at the church’s newspapers. It had a powerful resonance among the wider population—even people who were not Christians began to recognize the PCT as a defender of Taiwanese nation. Within the public statements of the PCT, national Taiwanese identity was closely connected with specific identity of the PCT. In those texts the PCT was represented as linked with the whole Taiwanese nation. The PCT even created a specific role of the church—the role of a ’prophet’ (xianzhi 先知). The PCT declared to become the prophet of Taiwanese nation, the voice of oppressed Taiwanese people. The church gave itself the right to specify what is good for whole society according to its own religious beliefs. It implies that the

4 On 28 Feb 1947, there was a hassle between local populace and KMT police after police had tried to forcibly arrest an old lady illegally selling cigarettes. Bystanders who protested such action were shot. It led to a rebellion and many attacks not only on police, but also on immigrants from the mainland. Protests were then violently suppressed. The ‘2·28 Incident’ has also been labelled ‘Taiwanese holocaust’ (Rubinstein, Christianity and Democratization in Modern Taiwan, 214–215).
church ascribed itself to be an important authority in society with high prestige and legitimacy.

1 Methodology and Sources

The paper is interested in how Taiwan has been narrated as a national subject within the public statements of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan since 1971. It doesn’t assume that the national identity narrated within those specific texts is shared by whole Taiwan’s population, neither does it state that the narrated national identity is based on existing community—it is much more just based on belief that such community exists. It is not an aim to measure how people in Taiwan identify (or have identified) themselves. The research is not interested in individual subjective identification of belonging. The focus is on narratives about Taiwanese national identity—particularly the narrative created by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan.

According to Melissa Brown, any national identity is not formed by common ancestry, common ethnicity, or common culture, and it is never fixed within clear borders. Rather, national identity is created, negotiated, and often changed upon shared social/political/economic experience. Only later, it is narrated through terms as culture or ancestry which create ideological reference framework. When any new identity is created, a story of group’s shared history is established. The story is inspired only by some chosen events and characteristics and it doesn’t need to be (and mostly isn’t) an objective history. The story plays an important part in reference framework, supporting claimed belonging of group’s members—and distinguishing them from other groups. Therefore,

7 Brown, «What’s in a Name?», 2–5.
national identity within the public statements is seen as created identity by the PCT—created for particular purposes.

The study is based on historical textual analysis and interpretation. The primary sources for the study are the Important Documents (zhongyao wenxian 重要文献) or so called »public statements« published by the PCT between years 1971—1995. The study works with the original Chinese texts as well as English versions of the statements.

The first Public Statement on Our National Fate by the PCT was written on 29 December 1971.8 The year 1971 was »a turning point in the fortunes of the ruling party and its regime, one marked by a series of diplomatic disasters«.9 The statement was written as a reaction to one of such ‘diplomatic disasters’—the announcement about the planned official visit of the US president Richard Nixon to the People Republic of China (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 中华人民共和国, PRC). This official visit (1972) was the first step towards normalization of relations between the USA and the PRC, which meant the end of official relations with the Republic of China (Zhonghua minguo 中華民國, ROC).10 The old ally of the ROC, the USA, was now turning towards the PRC. People in Taiwan were afraid because of a possible forceful reunification with communist China. Under such circumstances the PCT decided to publish the very first public statement, in which it declared the right of Taiwan to exist as a national

8 »Taiwan Jidu changlao jiaohui dui guoshi de shengming yu jianyi« 台灣基督長老教會對國是的聲明與建議, Taiwan jiaohui gongbao 台灣教會公報 March 1972; »Public Statement on Our National Fate«, Self-Determination (March 1973), 5.

9 Taiwan faced a series of diplomatic setbacks of its government. One of them was withdrawing the ROC from the United Nations, replacing it with the PRC. Next was Kissinger’s visit to Beijing (9–11 July 1971) dealing with the possibility of the US president Nixon visiting the PRC—Nixon’s visit, and issuance of the Shanghai Communiqué, took place in 1972 (Rubinstein, Murray, »The Presbyterian Church in the Formation of Taiwan’s Democratic Society, 1945–2004«, in Religious Organizations and Democratization: Case Studies from Contemporary Asia, ed by Cheng Tun-Jen and Deborah Brown [Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2006], 109–135, here 120).

entity without external interference.\textsuperscript{11} It also appealed for free election. The document was declared to be ecumenical work, however, it had a very strong political context. Publishing political document by religious organization was considered a quite controversial act. Under the martial law of the GMD government (1949–87) the freedom of speech and expression of public opinion were restricted and media were controlled.\textsuperscript{12} Therefore, it was very hard to formulate any opposition or criticism of the GMD government. The first public statement of the PCT is considered by some scholars to be the very first public declaration on the self-determination published in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{13}

Other public statements, also published in the weekly Taiwan Church’s News and circulated among foreign missions, have been written as reactions to certain social events. Later, in 1973, the English versions of statements were also published in the newly established English-language magazine \textit{Self-Determination}. The magazine was aimed at an international audience.\textsuperscript{14}

The study is interested in the official position of the PCT. The public statements of the PCT represent the church’s declarations about various social issues; therefore they are the best source for observing the official viewpoint of the church. The statements were addressed not only to the Christian community, but to the whole Taiwanese society, to the Taiwanese government, and the


\textsuperscript{14} PCE/FMC/6/01/108, Box 8: Presbyterian Church of England Foreign Missions Committee/Foreign Missions Committee/Presbyterian Church of England Foreign Missions Committee: Taiwan/Formosa/general correspondence, minutes and reports, \textit{School of Oriental and African Archive} (London).
English versions of the statements were addressed even to the international community. The statements also include the information that the PCT’s highest representatives considered them to be of highest importance.

For the purpose of research, all of the important documents written until 1995 were analyzed, but only some were particularly used—those mentioning Taiwanese national identity, identity of the church, highlighting uniqueness of Taiwanese inhabitants, or creating a specific bond between them. The following documents were used: Public Statement on Our National Fate by the PCT (1971), Our Appeal (1975), A Declaration on Human Rights by the PCT (1977), The Call to Respect Human Rights of Tribal People and Their Language (1978), Statement Concerning Events in Tiananmen Square in Beijing by the PCT (1989), Recommendations from the PCT Concerning the Present Situation (1990), The PCT’s «Declaration on the Sovereignty and Independence of Taiwan» (1991), and the Statement on «New and Independent Taiwan» (1995). Almost all of these documents have been translated to English by the church. Just two documents—the Statement Concerning Events in Tiananmen Square in Beijing (1989) and Statement on »New and Independent Taiwan« (1995)—have been written only in Chinese. English versions of the statements were addressed

to non-Chinese audiences, therefore they can slightly differ. For this reason, English versions of the statements were also analyzed and compared to Chinese ones.

In this paper, mainly results from the analysis are presented—therefore, there are just some particular references to primary sources serving as the significant representative.

2 The Issue of Taiwanese National Identity

Within the context of contemporary Taiwan, the question of national identity is still a very current issue. Since lifting of martial law in 1987, there was, among others, one evident political problem—an absence of consensus regarding national Taiwanese identity. Therefore, the question of national identity has started to be a very popular topic of public discussion. During Taiwan’s quite complicated history, there were different and changing groups of residents living in Taiwan. Those different groups used to distinguish each other by defining themselves according to ethnicity, local diversity, shared cultural heritage, common ancestry, etc. But in recent decades, there has been a public rise of the new Taiwanese national identity which is defined as multicultural and multi-ethnic, uniting four different ethnic groups living in Taiwan—the Hoklo (Heluoren 河洛人), the Hakka (Kejiaren 客家人), the Mainlanders (waishengren 外省人 ‘from other provinces’), and the indigenous people (yuanzhumin 原住民). It does not mean that there was literally no discussion about national identity before the 1980s. Actually, the earliest emergence of a distinctive Taiwanese nationalism goes back to the time of Japanese imperial rule in Taiwan.

In 1895, after the Sino-Japanese war, Taiwan was annexed by Japan, and Taiwan’s inhabitants became Japanese imperial subjects. According to the policy


of (gradual) assimilation (Jap. どか 同化), implemented by a colonial administration in 1896, the Taiwanese\(^\text{25}\) were supposed to «give up not only many of their customs and usages but, ultimately, their Chinese heritage as well.»\(^\text{26}\) For the purpose, a huge promotion of Japanese national culture, traditions as well as national language began.\(^\text{27}\) Taiwanese culture was expected to be replaced by Japanese culture. Education was seen as one of the primary means for assimilation, therefore new public schools for Taiwanese students (Jap. ぼうがっこう 公學校) were established.\(^\text{28}\) However, the colonial government did not truly want ruled subjects to be highly educated, because a higher education could lead to defiance and rebellion. For this reason, from the beginning of the Japanese colonial rule, only Japanese students in Taiwan could attend better equipped primary schools (Jap. しょうがっこう 小学校).\(^\text{29}\) Only in the 1910s and 1920s what Takeshi and Mangan call 'racial co-education' stopped to be prohibited at the post-primary level, and the first middle school for Taiwanese was grounded in Taizhong. At the post-primary level, Taiwanese stopped to be prohibited, and the first middle school for Taiwanese was founded in Taizhong.\(^\text{30}\) Thanks to education, a new intellectual elite among Taiwanese arose—realizing how much the treatment of Taiwanese people differed. At the same time, they started to see themselves as ethnically and culturally different from Japanese colonizers. It fostered the

\(^{25}\) In the context of this chapter, the term «Taiwanese» is used to describe all people living in Taiwan before the Japanese colonial rule (1895).


\(^{27}\) Ann Heylen, «Reflections on Becoming Educated in Colonial Taiwan», in Becoming Taiwan: From Colonialism to Democracy, ed. by Ann Heylen and Scott Sommers (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010), 149–164, here 149.


origin of a specific Taiwanese consciousness. The Taiwanese were discriminated and their status was much lower than the status of Japanese citizens. Only after full assimilation, they could become Japanese citizens with the full constitutional rights. Because the Taiwanese were often not fluent in Japanese, they were disadvantaged in applying for many working positions. They were considered to be only second-rate citizens.

After war between China and Japan broke out in 1937, Japan started to be more militant and totalitarian. Japanization of colonies was more urgent. Industrialization of Taiwan and imperialization of its inhabitants was one of the main aims of the colonial government. Therefore, the ‘movement of transformation into imperial subjects’ (Jap. kōinka undo 皇民化運動), with the primary goal of transforming Taiwanese into loyal imperial subjects (Jap. kōmin 皇民) supporting Japanese national policy, was implemented. Despite the effort of Japanese colonizers to make the Taiwanese loyal imperial subject, they were never willing to treat them fully equally, so Taiwanese people experienced clear categorical differences between themselves and Japanese which left them with a sense of non-Japanese identity.

At the end of World War II, during Cairo (1943) and Potsdam (1945) conferences, the Allied forced decided that Taiwan would be restored to the Republic of China. When Taiwan went under the administration of China, people in Taiwan considered this transition to be a happy event—they hoped to finally become equal citizens. However, very soon Taiwanese’s dissatisfaction increased. After the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, and the GMD lost civil war in the mainland China, the Republic of China became a government in exile. Taiwan’s people once again faced a change in terms of their belonging. Under the leadership of the GMD government, Taiwan was recognized as a province of the Republic of China and its people officially became Chinese citizens. The GMD government was concerned about previous fifty years of

31 Shih Fang-Long, "Taiwan's Subjectivity and National Narrations", 7.
33 Brown, "What's in a Name?", 9.
Japanese rule and its influence on Taiwan. Taiwanese people (who had lived in Taiwan before 1945) were considered to be disaffected to China, and the government made it impossible for them to fully participate in country politics. During the first years of martial law, the Taiwanese were largely excluded from political power in Taiwan, but in contrast, the newly arrived ‘Mainlanders’ were excluded from small and medium-sized business. The Taiwanese were underprivileged citizens, and they did not share the same identity as the Mainlanders. Because the GMD government claimed Taiwan to be nationally Chinese, the result was a suppression of any cultural, ethnical, or linguistic differences. The GMD government established policies to re-sinicize the Taiwanese, to promote Chinese culture—and to make them fully Chinese again. The government started to propagate Chinese national language (guoyu) as the only allowed language. Taiwanese dialects and aboriginal languages were marked as less dignified than guoyu. Only Chinese history was taught at school—Taiwan was included into curricula only as one of the ROC’s provinces. History textbooks virtually mentioned only life on the mainland. These policies of sinization implied that it should have been easy for everyone to become an equal Han Chinese, but the reality was different. It was very difficult for Taiwanese to be treated as equals by mainlanders. The situation was comparable to the conditions during Japanese occupation. Taiwanese people were frustrated to be once again ruled by outsiders with whom they were unable to identify.

This was the background for the rise of many Taiwanese national movements. Some of them were based on common ethnicity while others on common citizenship. According to the first mentioned, Taiwanese included only Hoklo people—ethnic national identity was created upon common ancestry, common language, and common culture. But this national identity was excluding other

35 Wachman, «Competing Identities in Taiwan», 27.
36 Brown, «What's in a Name?», 10.
37 Wachman, «Competing Identities in Taiwan», 40–53.
39 Brown, «What's in a Name?», 30.
people living in Taiwan who often shared the very same experience. Contrariwise, civic nationalism was able to bring together all people in Taiwan, all Taiwan’s citizens. Therefore, in civic nationalism, Taiwanese is a political term, connecting people with different cultural, linguistic, ethnic background. This national identity has been also adopted by the PCT that has recognized itself as Taiwanese church connecting Hoklo, Hakka, and indigenous people. In fact, nowadays many scholars as well as people living in Taiwan believe Taiwanese national identity is civic in nature. According to Amae Yoshihisa, the Presbyterian Church has been a catalyst of discourse on civic Taiwanese nationalism, and therefore the church can be seen as very influential for the society.

3 The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan and the Promotion of New Taiwanese National Identity

In Taiwan’s context, conversion to Christianity could be problematic and the protestant mission has often faced such issue. The church can grow only if it is able to adapt itself to Taiwanese society. The missionaries often care also about other problems, not just eternal salvation. During sermons pastors sometimes rather react to day-to-day matters of the believers than discuss the exegesis of Bible. Support of the new Taiwanese national identity can be understood as PCT’s reaction to contemporary needs of people.

Since 1970s, the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan has been the promoter of specific Taiwanese national identity—it is obvious from how terms »Taiwan« and »Republic of China« were used in all public statements of the PCT. Before the year 1987, the term »Taiwan« was used 24 times referring to country, state, or

42 Rubinstei, »Mission of Faith, Burden of Witness«, 88.
43 Yang Shu-Yuan, »Christianity, Identity, and the Construction of Moral Community among the Bunun of Taiwan«, Social Analysis 52,3 (2008), 51–74, here 51.
territory. In contrast, the term «Republic of China» was used only 4 times. Similarly, «Taiwan» («Taiwanese») as a qualifier for persons was used 15 times, but people of the «Republic of China» appears only once. Furthermore, «Taiwan» is connected with the noun ‘people/inhabitants’ (renmin 人民) as well as with the noun ‘compatriots’ (tongbao 同胞). The term tongbao can also mean ‘siblings’ (people born from the same parents, having the same ancestors). Even in the English versions of statements the term tongbao is translated as ‘brothers and sisters’. The term has an emotional connotation—it deepens the sense of belonging, and creates certain bond within the text of the public statements. After lifting of martial law in 1987, the trend favouring the term «Taiwan» continued—«Taiwan» was used 25 times more frequently. Usage of different names for the territory of Taiwan has a great significance. For example President Lee Teng-hui (Li Denghui 李登輝, b1923) has preferred the term «Republic of China» in his official speeches. He has used this name for Taiwan in order to sinicize the population of Taiwan—promoting the Chinese identity of Taiwanese people. If the PCT has implemented just the opposite strategy in the name used for Taiwan, we can assume this is because of the church’s attempt to create a distinct Taiwanese national identity separate from Chinese identity.

In the public statements, the Presbyterian Church did not only promote national Taiwanese identity but, more importantly, also introduced the new model of identity. The new model rejected ethnic nationalism that considered only Hoklo people, the biggest ethnic group in Taiwan, to belong to the ‘Taiwanese nation’. Civic nationalism, introduced in the statements, did not build Taiwanese national identity on common ethnicity, culture or language. On the contrary, in the very first Public Statement on Our National Fate by the PCT,

44 The most commonly used term for denoting country/state/territory was the neutral ‘country’ (guojia 国家)—55 times.
45 «Our Appeal by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan: Concerning the Bible, the Church and the Nation, 1975» (English version), <http://english.pct.org.tw/Article/enArticle_public_19751118.html> (2 Apr 2016).
the PCT made a noticeable effort to interconnect people with different cultural and ethnic background:

The current inhabitants of Taiwan—of which some ancestors settled here thousands of years ago, most moved here two-three centuries ago, and some came here after World War II. Despite the fact that our backgrounds and opinions may different, we have a common belief and ambitions—we love this island, it is our home [...]
certainly we are not willing to live under the communist totalitarian system.

From this formulation it is clear that Taiwan is regarded to be home for various different individuals and groups. At the same time, within the text, there is established unification among them, leading to united identification. According to the statement, all that is needed is to call Taiwan one’s own home and love the island. Thus, a very strong emotional bond between residents and the territory of Taiwan is created. It does not matter, according to the statement, whether Taiwan’s residents have different origin or even (political) opinions. Even if it is not made explicit, the only important thing is to team up against the PRC and its communist regime. In general, if different groups in Taiwan (including the PCT) share mutual aims, it is a sufficient basis for common identity. It does

47 «Taiwan Jidu changlao jiaohui du guoshi de shengming yu jianyi» <pct.org.tw/ab_doc.aspx?DocID=001> (2 Apr 2016). The statement was also translated into English by the church. However, the characterization of the PRC regime as ‘communist totalitarian system’ (gongchan jiquan 共產極權) is missing in the English version, «Statement on Our National Fate by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan» <english.pct.org.tw/Article/enArticle_public_19711229.html> (2 Apr 2016).

48 Such a requirement was a reaction to the already mentioned visit to Beijing by Kissinger in 1971. People in Taiwan were afraid that the normalization of relations between the USA and the PRC would lead to handover of Taiwan under the administration of the PRC. The PCT was just verbalizing concerns in Taiwan’s society.

49 James Chai Cu-Kao, «A Contextual Missiology for the Southern Baptist Church in Taiwan: Reviewing the Past and Envisioning the Future», in The Missional Church in Context: Helping
not matter whether there are differences in language, culture, ethnicity, or even religion. Christianity, therefore, should not be perceived as something distinctive—if Christians live in Taiwan, love it, identify with its people, and fight for better future of Taiwan, they should be easily connected with other Taiwanese people. According to the PCT, all who share the same aims can share the same identity. The PCT represents itself as closely linked to Taiwanese population. The church has been fighting for the Taiwanese nation—it's members share the same identity with the rest of Taiwan's population.

We can find a very similar argumentation in other public statements of the PCT. Those statements contain explicit or implicit reference about multi-ethnic national identity based on common citizenship. In 1975, in Our Appeal there were already some signs, but the idea of the new model of national identity wasn't yet formulated:

We can find a very similar argumentation in other public statements of the PCT. Those statements contain explicit or implicit reference about multi-ethnic national identity based on common citizenship. In 1975, in Our Appeal there were already some signs, but the idea of the new model of national identity wasn't yet formulated:

Citizens should enjoy privileges, responsibilities, and the same opportunities. After all, we are all compatriots (brothers and sisters) living in the same territory. Therefore, we should treat each other with mutual understanding, help each other, and adopt the attitude of mutual belonging.

In the statement, there was already the idea of 'mutual belonging' according to shared citizenship and territory. Another, more concrete formulation of a multi-ethnic nation/society included in the in statement written in 1987:


We believe that only the elimination of barriers between aboriginal people and compatriots (brothers and sisters) in the plains allows to enjoy an equal compatriot relationship. We call upon all plains compatriots (brothers and sisters) and churches in the plains to create a new approach to actively cooperate with indigenous people with compassion and mutual respect, enabling our society to establish a multi-ethnic coexistence and to enjoy the variety of cultural characteristics.

During the presidency (1988–2000) of Lee Teng-hui, the ‘Taiwanization movement’ (bentuhua 本土化) took place. Not only the approach of Lee Teng-hui, but also the DPP campaign helped to increase national consciousness. The bentuhua movement was an integral part of democratic reforms which took place in the 1990s. The DPP started to describe the Taiwanese nation as consisting of ‘Four Great Ethnic Groups’: Hoklo, Hakka, Mainlanders, and the original inhabitants (yuanzhumin). According to Shih Fang-Long, it was President Lee Teng-hui who tried to develop the concept of a ‘new Taiwanese’. In 1994, he said about the Taiwanese nation:

> Between us, there should be no argument about ethnic division. We are all Chinese. Only identify with Taiwan, give your heart to preserving and developing Taiwan, no matter what ethnic group, no matter whether you came to Taiwan early or late, then all are Taiwanese.55

But we have seen that actually, it was the PCT to express this idea even before President Lee Teng-hui did so. The argument for united identity in the PCT’s public statements and the proclamation of Lee Teng-hui is the same—any ethnical or cultural difference does not matter, and there should be no division according to the time when someone settled in Taiwan. Before the 1990s, people in Taiwan were not so much divided according to their province of origin, but the important factor was the time of arrival to Taiwan and the opinion about Taiwan’s belonging and political status. Lee Teng-hui is a member of the Presbyterian Church. Therefore, we can assume that he was influenced by the narrative of the PCT. An important difference between both formulations is the

54 Ibid., 7.
55 Ibid., 20 (from Zhongguo shibao 中国时报, 31 Dec 1994).
56 Wachman, «Competing Identities in Taiwan», 31.
highlighting of unification of Chinese and Taiwanese identity in President Lee Teng-hui’s wording. The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan did not try to connect Chinese and Taiwanese identity. The church felt no need to remind its followers of their Chinese cultural or linguistic heritage.

The Taiwanese nation as a multi-ethnic nation explicitly appeared for the first time in the statement written in 1995:

新國家理念：台灣是由多種不同背景之族群所組成的多元社會。台灣國應建立在全體人民互尊、互信及平等之基礎上。
新國家國民：凡認同台灣為其鄉土。

The concept of a new country: Taiwan is a multi-ethnic society with diverse ethnic groups with different backgrounds. Taiwan as a state should be based on mutual respect, mutual trust and equality among all people.

The citizens of the new country: Anyone who consider Taiwan to be one's homeland (native soil).

This statement repeats the PCT church’s position about Taiwanese national identity. National identity is multi-ethnic, and this model is in direct opposition to ethnic nationalism. It highlights the common civic belonging and goals, instead of ethnic particularity. Such reaffirmation was caused by contemporary discussion about whether ‘Taiwanese’ mean all people living in Taiwan or only Hoklo people—it was contest between civic and ethnic nationalism. In 1990s, the term ‘Taiwanese’, for its ambiguity and vagueness, was used for political purposes—sometimes it was used to refer to all residents of Taiwan but in areas where there was a struggle for power, the DPP tended to stress the politics of ethnicity and identity, and ‘Taiwanese’ thus merely stood for the majority Hoklo people. In that time, Taiwanization was also associated with ethnic identity of Hoklo people. But the PCT proclaimed its position about the issue very clearly—it still promoted a united multi-ethnic Taiwanese national identity. It is clear that anyone who considers Taiwan to be his own home can identify as Taiwanese—as somebody united with whole of Taiwan’s population.

58 Shih Fang-Long, “Taiwan’s Subjectivity and National Narrations”, 23.
59 Ibid.
At the time of publishing analyzed statements, the PCT focused its mission on various ethnic groups within Taiwan, not just on Hoklo people. The church was supporting minorities—among them aboriginal tribes. Aboriginal people do not share the same language, culture, nor ethnicity with the rest of Taiwan's population. When thinking about national identity, the church could not forget about the fact many of its believers from aboriginal tribes. The mission was often received more positively within minority groups with some social stigma. The PCT tried to improve situation of such underprivileged groups. The church played a crucial role in mobilizing and supporting aboriginal people. It provided financial resources, education, and health care. The church also often criticized the KMT government for harming native people. Since Japanese colonial rule, tribal people in Taiwan experienced a long time of constant suppression of their unique identity. But the Christian community provided them a sense of

60 Conversion to Christian faith has been a huge problem for many people in Taiwan (as a country with a different culture and other religions). Furthermore, accepting such foreign system could mean a violation of norms related to family life, leading to negative impact on relationships with other family members. For example, filial piety and ancestor worship are one of the central values of Taiwan's society, but this practice is rejected (or at least changed) by the PCT as well as by many other Christian groups. In the same way, Christians are separated from local traditional religious culture—such as Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism (Chen Nan-Jou, «Contextualizing Catholicity: A Taiwanese Theology of Identification», Asia Journal of Theology 17 [2003], 341–363, here 342). The family has a strong influence on the conversion to Christianity. Even if someone is interested in Christianity, but family does not support her or him—it is a reason for not joining or dropping the church. The family provides a system of values that are internalized and very hard to change. The family represents a primary reference group, and to leave the primary reference group means to risk alienation and isolation (Allen Swanson, Mending the Nets: Taiwan Church Growth and Loss in the 1980s [Pasadena, CA: William Carey Library, 1986], 140). Thus, mission has been quite successful among underprivileged groups with its members not so much concerning about losing social status and support.


belonging. The PCT promoted aboriginal languages and preserved their culture. A large amount of presbyteries were established among original inhabitants. But at the same time, the church used its influence to gain new members.\(^6\) That is why the PCT could not defend aims of only one group in Taiwan—in general, the main goal of any Christian group is to convert and bind up all people in one united Church.

4 Conclusions

According to Melissa Brown, aboriginal people have been only recently included into the concept of a new Taiwanese identity.\(^6\) I argue, however, that the PCT has been constructing this blended identity at least since the 1970s. The church has suggested to consider Taiwanese national identity as identity which connects people—because united group would be able to be heard by the government. Later, a rich cultural heritage from mainland China has been recognized, but it has been claimed to be changed through Taiwan’s peculiar history. The new cultural form and identity has been the result of this historical change.\(^6\) Thanks to this narrative, Taiwanese national identity (including also aborigines) has been constructed as distinctive identity from Chinese identity.\(^6\)

I believe, the statements appeal for equality and recognition of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural identity was also an effort to connect Taiwanese national identity with a specific Presbyterian identity. It might be surprising that the church never mentioned its own religious belief during its reflections about national identity (but the statements are proclaimed to be ecumenical works). But even without any reference to Christianity, the church was still able to unite its own identity with Taiwanese national identity (as created within the statements). It is very clear that all statements agreed on who should be perceived as included within Taiwanese national identity—anyone who loves Taiwan and see


\(^6\) Brown, «What’s in a Name?», 13.

\(^6\) Wachman, «Competing Identities in Taiwan», 50.

\(^6\) Brown, «What’s in a Name?», 21.
it as one’s own home. As noted by Yang Huilin, a scholar researching religion in China, Christianity was as a foreign religious system in China (and Taiwan) and therefore Christian groups needed to establish a link with Chinese identity (local identity). In accordance with analysis of this paper, the PCT employed precisely this strategy. Christian missionaries have always emphasized the need to create a linkage with the culture they have operated in, and to remove a stigma of a foreign religion. Thus, only the PCT’s identity can be included to Taiwanese national identity, but Taiwanese national identity cannot be covered by PCT’s identity. It would be counterproductive to bond Taiwanese national identity with the Christianity—not everybody would be able to truly identify with such concept.

As it has been shown in the analysis, the PCT supported civic nationalism rather than nationalism based on ethnicity. I have tried to explain that the church implemented this strategy as it was focusing its mission on various groups in Taiwan—and, therefore, it would be unreasonable to support just one group. The proclamations of the PCT concerning the new Taiwanese identity were important for several reasons. At first, they made it possible to interconnect people with different ethnical backgrounds and various cultural heritage. They also doubted previous definitions according to which ‘Taiwanese’ were only those who had been living in Taiwan before the GMD’s arrival in 1945. The PCT recognized Taiwan as a separate unit with its own nation. The last very significant reason was the possibility to connect the Presbyterian Church with Taiwanese national identity—they do not only share the same aims, but the PCT is a visible fighter for ‘Taiwan church’s issue’—it is the church that was the brave voice of the powerless and suppressed Taiwanese nation.

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67 Yang, Huilin, *China, Christianity, and the Question of Culture* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2014), 32.

68 Ibid., 50.