ignite. Nevertheless, the pyromaniac would be completely justified in believing that striking the Sure-Fire match will cause it to ignite. Hence the statement that striking the match will *not* cause it to light is defeating.

9 A similar objection to Lehrer's earlier analysis is raised by Harman, p. 243.
10 Chisholm; see footnote at end of chap. I, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 23.
11 "An Analysis of Factual Knowledge," p. 158.
12 Cf. Alvin Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowing," *Journal of Philosophy* 64 (1967): 357–372; p. 359.
13 R.M. Chisholm and others, *Philosophy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964), pp. 263–277.

QUESTIONS

1 According to Lehrer and Paxson, under what conditions does S have basic knowledge that *h*?
2 According to Lehrer and Paxson, under what conditions does *q* defeat S's justification for believing *h*?
3 According to Lehrer and Paxson, under what conditions does S have non-basic knowledge that *h*?

Robert Nozick, "Knowledge"

Conditions for knowledge

Our task is to formulate further conditions to go alongside

(1) p is true
(2) S believes that p.

We would like each condition to be necessary for knowledge, so any case that fails to satisfy it will not be an instance of knowledge. Furthermore, we would like the conditions to be jointly sufficient for knowledge, so any case that satisfies all of them will be an instance of knowledge. We first shall formulate conditions that seem to handle ordinary cases correctly, classifying as knowledge cases which are knowledge, and as nonknowledge cases which are not; then we shall check to see how these conditions handle some difficult cases discussed in the literature.

The causal condition on knowledge, previously mentioned, provides an inhospitable environment for mathematical and ethical knowledge; also there are well-known difficulties in specifying the type of causal connection. If someone floating in a tank oblivious to everything around him is given (by direct electrical and chemical stimulation of the brain) the belief that he is floating in a tank with his brain being stimulated, then even though that fact is part of the cause of his belief, still he does not know that it is true.

Let us consider a different third condition:

(3) If p weren't true, S wouldn't believe that p.

Throughout this work, let us write the subjunctive "if-then" by an arrow, and the negation of a sentence by prefacing "not-" to it. The above condition thus is rewritten as:

(3) not-$p \rightarrow$ not-(S believes that p).

This subjunctive condition is not unrelated to the causal condition. Often when

Robert Nozick, "Knowledge," *Philosophical Explanations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).