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An Examination of  
**PLATO'S  
DOCTRINES**

by

**I. M. Crombie**

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II. PLATO ON KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY

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## PREFACE

FOR an account of what I have tried to do in this book I would refer the reader to the Preface and Introductory Notes to the first volume. This second volume contains my account of Plato's treatment of the more technical problems of philosophy. I have tried to make it self-contained; this has entailed some repetition of matters already treated in Volume 1. I repeat the acknowledgments made in the earlier preface. In particular my thanks are due to my colleagues and pupils for what I have learnt from them; to Professor Ayer who kindly read my manuscript and persuaded me to remove some of its faults; to Mr. B. G. Mitchell who read and commented on an earlier draft of Chapter 1; to Mr. J. C. B. Gosling, from discussions with whom I have learnt a very great deal about the topics treated here (though I doubt whether he will agree with many of my conclusions); to Mr. R. M. Hare, whose article on Philosophical Discoveries (*Mind* 1960) has helped me to crystallise some of the things that I wanted to say; to Professor Ryle, whose studies in Plato, published and unpublished, have done so much to breathe life into the discussion of Plato's later work.

I. M. CROMBIE

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